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This paper offers a new approach to economic development, which we call performance-
based policy. The basic idea is to get better information to implement better development 
decisions. The approach combines the use of information markets with payments for 
performance.  
 
An information market is a market for a contract that yields a payment based on the 
outcome of an uncertain future event, such as the number of people infected by HIV in Africa in 
2010. We show how these markets can help provide real-time information on the likely benefits 
and costs of different development projects. 
 
We argue that information markets combined with pay-for-performance contracts have 
the potential to improve the way aid agencies, foundations, non-governmental organizations, and 
the private sector promote economic development. In addition to providing economic benefits, 
performance-based policy could lead to greater accountability and transparency in economic 
development. Despite its great potential, the approach has some limitations, particularly in 

























ur dream is a World Free of Poverty” reads the
sign at the entrance to the World Bank headquarters.
That’s quite a lofty goal. So how do we achieve it?
The short answer is that no one is certain. The long
answer is that there is a way to substantially improve
on the basic model for economic development —
using a new kind of market and paying for performance. 
Not too long ago, foreign aid was viewed as a path to economic growth
for the developing world. In some quarters, most notably the development
banks and the United Nations, it still is. But there is dissension in the ranks.
Scholars have been chipping away at the aid-buys-growth paradigm for over
30 years — with some going so far as to suggest that state aid could actually
hurt the poorest of the poor. Over the past decade, revisionists have asserted
that foreign aid can be helpful, but only if countries pursue good policies.
So, if a country has good domestic economic policies and open trade, aid
can help; but aid can do little in the presence of poor policies. Some scholars
have questioned even this view, noting that measuring the impact of foreign
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aid depends on the definitions of terms like “aid,” “policies,” and “growth.”
Foreign aid, consisting of labor and capital that flow to particular coun-
tries, will tend to be good if those assets are spent wisely and bad if they are
not. The real question is how to spend those assets wisely. At one level, this
is a difficult question because it involves trying to get governments that may
be near-sighted or corrupt to take a longer view. It asks them to think about
investing in areas such as education, health, and roads instead of squander-
ing resources on wasteful activities. Solving this problem is difficult. One can
point to several success stories in getting developing countries to clean up
their acts, but there are numerous failures.
The potential perverse incentives of aid are well known. Recipient-coun-
try governments that use aid productively may not receive any more. Aid
bureaucracies that solve problems effectively could put themselves out of a
job. These perverse incentives prevent policymakers from spending aid wise-
ly. Furthermore, like many government programs that give out money, aid
programs rarely evaluate how well the aid is actually spent. The Meltzer
Commission notes, for example, that three to ten years after final disburse-
ment, the World Bank reviews the broad policy impact of just 5 percent of
its programs. 
To some extent, these problems can be overcome by setting up rules for
giving out aid. One such rule, currently in vogue, is that aid should be given
to really poor countries that promote good policies in general. Another rule
is to make sure that aid actually does what it is intended to do by paying the
project implementers based on actual results. Both of these rules may make
sense, but both have problems. Just giving aid to well-behaved poor coun-
tries may mean that donor countries have to write off a large part of the
developing world. Paying for performance sounds great in theory, but it may
be difficult to do in practice. 
While problems with foreign aid are legion, the problems in developing
countries are too important to be ignored. In 2000, an estimated 2.7 billion
people were living on less than $2 per day. These people could potentially
benefit from aid from rich countries and international institutions. The ques-
tion is how to make the best use of that aid.1
A new development model
A
id agencies want to spend their limited resources wisely, but
they frequently fall short. To allocate resources to their most high-
ly valued uses and get the maximum bang for each aid dollar
spent, an agency needs to do two things. The first is to get reasonable infor-
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implement projects effectively. 
Assume that we can solve the information problem. We will shortly
explain how to do so by making use of a new kind of market, an “informa-
tion market.” For now, consider an example that illustrates one way to
implement projects effectively: Suppose an aid agency is interested in getting
children vaccinated to prevent the outbreak of a disease in Malawi, and sup-
pose that the recipient government or the aid agency decides it is worth $5
for each child vaccinated. The agency can then auction off the right to
administer the vaccines to the highest bidder. That bidder receives $5 for
each child vaccinated where the number of children vaccinated would be
measured by a third-party auditor. 
This is an example of paying for performance.
The government gives out the performance contract
and waits to see whether the winning bidder will
deliver. The winning bidder gets paid on the basis of
what she delivers.
While there is much to be said for paying for per-
formance, there is even more to be said for paying
for performance when all parties have a good sense
of what they are likely to get before the project gets
started. In particular, such information can help an
aid agency allocate its limited resources to their most
highly valued uses — no small feat if it can be
accomplished.
This is where information markets can help. They can provide informa-
tion on the expected benefits of a project before things get underway. Here is
how these markets work. Suppose a stock exchange facilitates trading in a
contract that pays $0.01 for each child who will be vaccinated with the vac-
cination program, and suppose that the current price of that contract is $1.
This price implies that market participants expect 100 children will be vac-
cinated if the program goes into effect (100 times $0.01 equals $1). The
ultimate value of the contract is determined by the actual number of children
vaccinated at the end of the program. So, if 110 children get vaccinated,
then the final contract value is $1.10. This is a simple example of an infor-
mation market. These markets allow informed parties to trade contracts that
yield payments based on the outcome of an uncertain future event, such as
the number of children who would be vaccinated if the vaccination program
were auctioned off to the highest bidder. 
Now, suppose the same exchange offers another contract, which pays
$0.01 for each child vaccinated if there is no vaccination program in place.
Further, suppose the price of that contract is $0.10, which means the mar-
ket expects that 10 children will be vaccinated if the program does not go
into effect. Using this market pricing information, we can estimate the bene-
fits of the vaccination program. The market estimates that 100 children get








vaccinated with the program and only 10 without it, so the program is
expected to vaccinate an additional 90 children. Valued at $5 per child, the
expected monetary benefits are $450 in this example. 
Note that the information markets can provide a way of distinguishing
total vaccinations of children from those that would likely have taken place
anyway. This is a valuable feature of these markets that was not available up
to this point except through reliance on so-called experts. These markets
permit the aid agency and/or the host government to assess the incremental
impact of a program by determining how many additional children the pro-
gram is likely to vaccinate.
Implicitly, we are assuming that the market prices of the information mar-
ket contracts are not affected by the government’s
reliance on these prices in implementing its deci-
sions. If traders anticipate the government’s use of
the market prices, they will recognize that only pro-
grams with higher benefits will be implemented.
This anticipation will alter their willingness to buy
information market contracts based on policy bene-
fits, potentially biasing the resulting market prices
and the government’s decision based on these prices.
Elsewhere, we propose a mechanism that deals with
this concern by separating the information collection
and decision tasks. Specifically, if the information
market contracts do not depend on the govern-
ment’s decision rule, then the market prices will be
unbiased measures of benefits that can be used by the government. The idea
is to have the market depend on a random decision but to use this random
decision rule only infrequently. Most of the time, the government can simply
implement its preferred policy, using the unbiased market prices as a guide. 
We now have an estimate of the benefits of the program, which could be
useful for both the host country and the aid agency — but only if the num-
bers tell us something meaningful. 
What can we say about the quality of estimates that come from informa-
tion markets? The short answer is that information markets appear to do
better than experts in a number of settings. For example, Las Vegas odds
and point spreads predict the outcomes of sporting events better than sports
experts. The prices in Iowa political markets are more accurate than the
polls in forecasting elections 451 out of 596 times. Information markets at
Hewlett-Packard Labs beat official forecasts of printer sales 15 out of 16
times. Even Hollywood play-money markets perform better than four out of
five columnists in predicting the Oscars.
These markets work for several reasons: First, almost anyone can partici-
pate; second, they allow a person to profit from trading contracts that accu-
rately forecast the future — buying when the vaccination forecast is low and
selling when the forecast is high can result in profits; third, the profit motive






than experts.encourages people, including speculators, to look for better information all
the time. So the market price reflects a lot of information from diverse
sources, resulting in what James Surowiecki calls “The Wisdom of Crowds.”
Besides getting data on expected benefits, the aid agency would like to
know the expected net benefits of the vaccination project. A measure of
expected net benefits could be obtained by conducting a pay-for-perfor-
mance auction in which contractors were invited to bid for the right to
implement a program to increase vaccinations and to receive $5 for each
additional child who was vaccinated. The baseline vaccination rate could be
determined by the level predicted in the information market with no change
in policy — ten children in the above example. 
Note that there would be no bids unless at least
one bidder expected to be able to increase vaccina-
tions at a cost of less than $5 per child. The auction
price should represent the difference between what
the winning firm gets from producing results, in this
case social benefits, and the costs of producing those
results. In other words, the auction price is an esti-
mate of social net benefits. 
Suppose the auction price is $300 and the agency
has decided to award the contract to the highest bid-
der, so long as the bid suggests there are net benefits.
We now have a measure of expected benefits and
expected net benefits. With these measures, we can
also estimate the cost to the development agency and/or state footing the
bill. The payout, based on expected benefits, is $450. The expected net ben-
efits based on the auction is $300. Taking the difference yields the expected
cost of the project to the agency — $150.
Now we have three pieces of information that we did not have before: an
estimate of benefits from the vaccine program, an estimate of net benefits,
and an estimate of costs to the agency. This information is critical for the
agency in making a decision on whether to fund the project. Even if these
estimates turn out not to be perfect, they are generally better than experts’
estimates. 
Furthermore, the information on the vaccine program is not just available
to the agency or the host government. It is available to everyone. That
means the government can use it to choose wisely, potential bidders can base
their bids on better information, and others can use it to assess whether the
government’s proposed policy is likely to do what it claims. The information
from these markets is likely to promote greater openness and accountability. 
Information markets have another advantage in the context of devel-
opment: They can help the winning firm with project financing, there-
by encouraging competition in an area where ventures are often very
risky. If the winning bidder for the vaccine project sells some informa-
tion contracts to raise money, it can both reduce its risk and cover








some of the costs of the project.
The vaccine example was based on a classic model of aid that comes from
a state-sponsored institution, like the World Bank, the United Nations, or
the U.S. Agency for International Development (usaid). In some cases, the
cost of the project may be split between the recipient country and the aid
donor. Note, however, that the example could just as easily be applied to the
private sector or foundations. 
For example, suppose that the Gates Foundation were considering offer-
ing a performance contract that would give $1,000 per reduction in hiv
infections in sub-Saharan Africa before 2010. The foundation could go
through exactly the same exercise as we did for vaccines. This would yield
information on the likely benefits from the project in terms of reduced infec-
tion rates, the cost to the foundation of paying for results, and the cost to
the firm or non-governmental organization of implementing the project. It
could then decide whether this project is worth doing in comparison with
other worthy social projects.
We have just addressed the two big problems that confront all decision
makers who want to give out aid. Information markets can provide the aid
agency and the host government with information about the likely effects
from decision alternatives. And performance-based contracts can ensure that
the contractor is paid for what she actually delivers. Now, let us consider
how these ideas can be applied to a broad range of development problems.
Priorities: the Copenhagen Consensus
T
o illustrate the power of performance-based policy (pbp) in
setting priorities, consider the recently completed “Copenhagen
Consensus.” This was a high-powered attempt at prioritizing solu-
tions to the world’s most pressing problems. In May 2004, a group of eight
distinguished economists, including three Nobel laureates, assembled in
Copenhagen to see whether they could achieve consensus on the best ways
to meet the biggest challenges. To make the problem interesting, they
assumed that governments had an additional $50 billion to spend. 
The group was able to rank 17 social investments in four categories rang-
ing from bad to very good. The very-good category included investments in
controlling hiv/aids and malaria, reducing malnutrition, and promoting
free trade. The bad category included investments in slowing climate change
and employment in guest-worker programs.
The experts based their rankings on their estimates of economic and
social net benefits from different projects. To develop these estimates, they
relied on their collective wisdom, papers done by other experts, and criti-
cisms of those papers done by yet other experts. There is nothing wrong
with that approach. It may even be the best approach if one is forced to rely
on experts. 
Robert W. Hahn and Paul C. TetlockBut there are two critical problems with the expert model adopted by the
Copenhagen Consensus, both of which could be addressed by properly
designed information markets. First, the experts have access only to a subset
of the information available to the potential traders in information markets.
The likelihood of success for many of the proposed policy interventions
depends on information privately held by consumers, businesses, nongovern-
mental organizations, and other interested parties. It is virtually impossible
for a group of experts to replicate the information aggregation abilities of
market prices — a point that Hayek made over half a century ago in his cri-
tique of central planning. 
Second, the Copenhagen Consensus experts had no financial incentive to
make accurate estimates. Although we do not dis-
pute the motives of these experts, we caution against
relying on experts for advice when it is costless for
them to speak from their hearts and not from their
heads. This may not even be a conscious, malicious
act. There is considerable psychological evidence
showing that experts’ predictions are subject to cog-
nitive biases and perform poorly relative to simple
statistical models. By contrast, information markets
offer powerful financial incentives to overcome these
biases or at least repress them. Experts and others
bold enough to bet on their personal beliefs or pref-
erences would incur large costs from inaccuracy.
We examined all of the social policies ranked by the Copenhagen experts
and found that information market contracts could help provide guidance
on each one. For example, one policy proposes an intervention that could
slow the spread of hiv. One could use information markets to estimate the
effect of the policy intervention and then decide whether it was worth pay-
ing a certain amount for each infection reduced below the business-as-usual
scenario. If the performance contract for reducing the spread of hiv were
implemented, it would be important to use statistics from reliable sources to
verify performance. So, for example, in the case of the spread of aids, one
could use statistics from the World Health Organization.
This brief analysis of the Copenhagen Consensus suggests there is a great
deal of knowledge to be gained from using information markets to help
experts reach decisions. We suggest the following policy experiment: Let the
heads of state of leading developed countries commit a modest amount of
resources to making contingent payments for one or two problems that
would be designated by a select group. One possible role for experts would
be to help monetize the benefits and design the contracts for the information
markets. The experts could also consider policy suggestions from the public
at large, because information markets provide a low-cost method for evalu-
ating different policy alternatives. Following our suggested pbp framework,
governments could implement the information markets and auction the
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rights to the benefits from specific policies. 
The experiment could be evaluated by assessing how the prices of the
information market contracts change over time as the policy proposals are
implemented. If the markets are functioning well, prices will follow an
unpredictable path, implying that the original estimates of benefits were rea-
sonable. It will also be important to assess whether the firms implementing
the projects realize excessive profits. Finally, if the information markets fore-
cast realized benefits and net benefits well, governments should consider
running the experiment on a larger scale.
Rethinking existing development efforts 
I
n september 2000, the un issued the Millennium Declaration,
which contained the Millennium Development Goals (mdg). The
declaration identifies eight broad social goals, including eradicating
extreme poverty and hunger, reducing child mortality, promoting gender
equality and empowering women, combating hiv and other diseases, and
ensuring environmental sustainability. 
The goals have received widespread support. All 191 current un member
states have agreed to try to achieve the goals by the year 2015, using 1990
as a reference year. The World Bank has signed on and displays all of the
goals prominently in the lobby of its Washington, D.C., headquarters. 
Several organizations are allocating considerable resources to achieving
the mdg. In 2003, the World Bank spent $18.5 billion and worked in more
than 100 developing countries. In late 2002, usaid announced that it
would begin “monitoring and tracking all of its development assessment
through the lens of the Millennium Development Goals.” In 2003, usaid
provided $14.2 billion in assistance. 
One problem with the goals, recognized by the un, is that they lack speci-
ficity. What does it mean, for example, to eradicate extreme poverty? To
make the goals operational, the un published targets associated with each
one and indicators associated with each target. There are 18 targets that
provide verifiable measures of achievement. There are also 48 indicators
that measure progress toward the targets. Under the goal of eradicating
poverty, for example, there is a target of halving the fraction of people who
earn less than $1 per day between 1990 and 2015. One of the indicators
for this target is the proportion of the population earning below $1 per day,
using an exchange rate based on purchasing power parity. The United
Nations keeps data on how well individual countries are progressing on
these indicators.
While the approach taken by the un is ambitious, it has two big prob-
lems. First, very little attention has been given to setting feasible goals that
could maximize net benefits. Second, very little attention has been given to
implementing policies in the most effective manner. 
Robert W. Hahn and Paul C. TetlockIt should come as no surprise, then, that even the agencies charged with
helping to achieve the goals, such as the World Bank, suggest that the mdg
may not be achieved unless considerably more resources are devoted to the
task. A 2002 World Bank study estimated that the world would require an
additional $40 billion to $70 billion of development assistance per year to
meet the mdg by 2015. And while progress has been made in some parts of
the world, such as East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa is lagging far behind.
At this point, the mdg represent little more than a wish list specifying
what some well-intentioned practitioners would like to see happen. The goal
setters do not appear to have paid significant attention to the benefits and
costs of different options before setting goals; nor does it appear that the
goal setters paid sufficient attention to real budget
constraints so that they could provide a realistic
assessment of the feasibility of meeting the goals. It
also does not appear that the goal setters have given
much serious thought to putting proper incentives in
place to assure that maximum benefits will be
achieved for a given level of expenditures. Instead,
hundreds of countries and organizations have signed
on to support the goals without any clear rewards if
they are reached or penalties if they are not. 
It is almost a certainty that the un or some other
agency will go through a similar goal-setting exercise
in the near future. Thus, it is worth asking how the
process could be improved and, in particular, how performance-based policy
could help. The answer is that pbp could help both in setting broad goals
and in implementing them, provided that there is some concrete way to mea-
sure progress. 
At the top level, performance-based policy could help with establishing
priorities in the same way that we suggested for the Copenhagen Consensus.
Combining pbp with information markets could provide information on
the costs and benefits of different alternatives. Specifically, markets could
provide estimates of the costs, benefits, and expected results of different
development projects. In the context of the vaccine example considered
above, the agency may want to know the difference in the number of chil-
dren vaccinated if it pays $3 per vaccine instead of $5. The agency may also
want to compare the likely results of different plans, such as one that pays
$100 per reduction in infant mortality versus a vaccine program that pays
$5 per vaccination. 
Armed with such information, an agency like the un could make reason-
able decisions about allocating limited resources to their most highly valued
uses. It would do so by comparing the effectiveness of different programs,
based on the market’s assessment of the expected impact of specific pro-
grams. The un would get well-deserved credit (or blame) for actions that
directly result from its interventions. In this way, pbp encourages account-








ability. It also encourages openness, because the information gained in evalu-
ating the effectiveness of projects and paying for results could be made pub-
lic.
The same kind of approach could be applied to domestic foreign aid pro-
grams. The U.S. is currently engaged in an exercise that could be tailor-made
for performance-based policy. In January 2004, the Congress created the
Millennium Challenge Account (mca) as a vehicle to provide more targeted
aid to developing countries. The aim of the mca is to help developing coun-
tries that satisfy certain criteria meet specific goals. Congress appropriated
$1 billion for the mca for 2004 and has requested $2.5 billion for 2005. 
Paul Applegarth, the ceo of the U.S. Millenium Challenge Corporation,
said the U.S. “will enter into a compact with mca
countries that defines responsibilities. Each compact
will include clearly defined objectives, outcomes and
intermediate benchmarks. Monitoring and evalua-
tion will be built in from the start and be ongoing
throughout the program.” 
While the mca’s focus on performance is laud-
able, we are concerned that this effort could get
bogged down in unnecessary paperwork and
bureaucracy. Countries wishing to receive aid must
submit detailed project proposals that explain the
financing required and the mechanisms for evalua-
tion. Unfortunately, a proposal may give policymak-
ers little information about a project’s true costs and
benefits. If projects cost more or yield fewer benefits than countries expect,
the mca will have wasted money.
One clear alternative to the mca is to pay for results using pbp without
introducing all of the complexities of the country eligibility requirements.
For example, a country’s eligibility for aid is based on whether it rules justly,
invests in people, and encourages economic freedom. However, the countries
that fail to meet the requirements may need aid the most. 
Suppose a pbp framework indicates that the net benefits of vaccinating
500,000 children in Ecuador are much greater than those from an irriga-
tion project in Yugoslavia. In this case, the U.S. may want to give a contract
to the vaccination company rather than the irrigation company, irrespective
of which government meets the basic qualifications. Because performance-
based policy is somewhat insulated from government corruption and misuse,
the mca’s complex qualification process would be unnecessary. pbp would
allow the U.S. to aid countries with “bad policies” and still get good results.
The key point is that performance-based policy allows the donor to target
aid to its highest-valued uses without imposing conditionality. 
Some experts in the development field argue that performance-based poli-
cies are not likely to be helpful because policymakers already know which
projects are most valuable to society. These critics view the problem in terms
Robert W. Hahn and Paul C. Tetlock
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accountable. of government corruption and political instability. Our view is that this is an
empirical question that can be answered only by experimenting with the per-
formance-based policy mechanism. In any case, because the performance-
based policy framework increases accountability and transparency, it may
prove to be part of the solution to the corruption problem as well.
It is unclear in many situations which policies are best for developing
nations. Thus, investing in mechanisms that provide better information
upfront could pay handsome dividends.
Transition to performance 
T
o move to a pbp paradigm for development, the government
should reduce regulatory barriers to the use of information mar-
kets. Interested parties should build prototypes to determine what
really works. Finally, more attention needs to be paid to how this new
approach will affect various interest groups.
There is already a lot of activity in the area of information markets.
Professors at the University of Iowa pioneered the use of these markets to
help forecast elections in the late 1980s. A Web site called Tradesports.com
has information markets for sporting events, financial indices, political
events, and legal outcomes. And Goldman Sachs supports an exchange that
hosts auctions for derivatives based on the value of economic indices.
Furthermore, firms are approaching regulators in Washington to find out
whether they can set up other markets. Hurdles have arisen because infor-
mation markets are regulated under “Internet gambling” laws.
To encourage the use of information markets for improving policy, we
strongly recommend that regulators distinguish between markets for gam-
bling — like on-line poker games — and information markets aimed at
improving, say, economic development. While there are clearly gray areas,
regulators could use a number of criteria for deciding whether contracts
should be allowed, including whether the contract provides useful informa-
tion on a policy objective and whether it would allow interested parties to
spread risk more efficiently. Thus, a market used to predict the number of
vaccinations that would result from a vaccine program should be permitted
without question. 
The next step is to develop prototypes to learn where the approach works
best. This could be done by foundations, developing governments, or places
like the World Bank. There is no magic formula for ushering in a new para-
digm, but there may be some useful rules of thumb. We believe it is sensible
to start on a small scale to refine the pbp model before deciding to ramp up.
If pbp is shown to work well, then the government should focus on projects
that will have a substantial impact.
The limitations of information markets also need to be acknowledged. To
work well, the pbp process needs to be relatively free of corruption. While
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we recognize that corruption is a serious problem in some developing coun-
tries, we think that its potentially adverse impacts can be managed through a
judicious choice of project selection and pbp design. If, for example, the host
country limits parties that are eligible to implement the performance con-
tract, this will raise the costs of implementing the project. pbp could still
work in this case, but it would be more expensive than if the project were
bid on competitively.
A second problem is that these markets require a reasonable number of
motivated buyers and sellers. Liquidity in these markets cannot be assumed.
The government may want to explore ways of subsidizing liquidity if it is
interested in addressing a particular problem. 
Performance-based policy also cannot work if the results of a develop-
ment project cannot be defined or measured. While some projects with
unquantifiable benefits and costs may be worthwhile, we think it is impor-
tant for agencies charged with development to work on finding better perfor-
mance measures before they embark on large development initiatives using
taxpayer dollars.
Finally, moving to a performance-based policy paradigm for development
is likely to create winners and losers. This system is designed to produce
results by paying for those results. There may be some parts of the develop-
ment community that are more comfortable with the status quo, precisely
because they benefit from the current system and know how it works. To the
extent that these groups can block change, they will need to be compensated
in some way. Furthermore, it is important to educate the public and interest
groups on why this approach can lead to better decisions.
We have argued that combining information markets with paying for per-
formance has the potential to improve how aid is delivered. In addition to
introducing an approach that yields real economic benefits, lawmakers will
be able to hold bureaucrats more accountable for results. Ultimately, voters
will be able to hold their elected officials more accountable for expenditures
on economic development. 
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